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The Class Analysis of Households Extended: Children, Fathers and Family Budgets 
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff 
 
Introduction 
 Since the 1994 publication of Bringing It All Back Home, commentators have 
 raised a variety of questions and criticisms. Subsequently published applications of our 
book’s new class theory of households, by ourselves and others, have raised new issues 
not foreseen when we first developed the theory. In this paper we will address the major 
points of these reactions in ways that extend the class analysis of households well beyond 
our book and the literature it provoked and informed. The following topic areas will 
sequentially structure our presentation: children, interactions between the class structures 
of households and of enterprises, the class complexity of the household budget, class 
contradictions between households and enterprises, fathers’ household labor, and when 
children become household serfs. A short addendum addresses households from which 
class is absent because production there has dwindled and only consumption remains.  
 Analyzing these new topics broadens and deepens two central points of our 1994 
work. First, by conceiving class processes and contradictions and struggles over class as 
components of households, we can explore how class directly affects all the other, non-
class dimensions of those households: affective, marital, political, sexual, parental, 
financial, and so forth. We can show in particular how the class structure of households 
influences in contradictory ways (1) parents’ rearing of children, (2) household budgets, 
and (3) father’s household labor. Our analysis demonstrates and underscores how the 
good and bad of family life are intimately connected to class. Second, we will further 
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develop or analysis of the interaction between household and enterprise class structures. 
Here we will stress how individuals are shaped by class processes, contradictions, and 
conflicts not only on the job but also and differently at home. Marxian analyses need to 
recognize this differential shaping to understand better the complexity of individual 
behavior including, as we will emphasize, its contradictory nature.  
Children 
How are we to understand children in relation to the class processes we have 
identified and explored inside as well as outside the modern household?1 In other words, 
how do children fit within our framework that defines class in terms of processes of 
producing, appropriating, and distributing surplus labor or its (surplus) products?  
Depending on their age and other social factors including child labor laws, 
kinship traditions, religious customs, industrialization, and technical skills, children’s 
labor power may be sold (by themselves, parents, or others) to employers outside their 
households. Their sustenance would then derive from the portion of the wages paid for 
their labor power that the children actually used for consumption. For example, Marx’s 
Capital repeatedly pays attention to the factory labor of children in the rapidly developing 
capitalism of his day. Engels too described their horrifying conditions, pertinent today not 
only because children still comprise significant parts of capitalism’s global labor force, 
but also as a reminder of capitalism’s cruelty to its more vulnerable populations (1968). 
Historically, one source of children’s subsistence has been value flows received for their 
labor power through market exchanges with their capitalist employers. Moreover, such 
children have performed as both productive and unproductive laborers according to the 
specific requirements of capitalist employers and the social conditions of their 
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employment. The class analysis of adult wage-earners applies and has been applied to 
children who occupy parallel positions in relation to capitalist enterprises. Here, however, 
our focus is on analyzing children whose labor power is not sold to capitalists.  
Unlike adults, children rarely function as employers of others, adults or children. 
Because of their infrequent service on industrial corporate boards of directors or as 
surplus appropriators in smaller, unincorporated industrial enterprises, we do not analyze 
such possibilities here. However, a brief mention is warranted for children who live by 
owning property used in capitalist class structures. If they have received gifts or 
inheritances of property – such as land leased to capitalists, money lent to them, securities 
representing ownership of capitalists’ means of production, etc. - children can live from 
the resulting payments (rents, interest, dividends, etc.) paid by capitalists for their access 
to such property.2  
We turn our analysis then toward the mass of children whose connections to the 
capitalist class structures of most enterprises in modern economies are not those of wage-
earners or property owners. Rather, these are the children who live within and depend 
upon households whose internal production relations are characterized, as per our earlier 
work (1994), by feudal and other non-capitalist class structures. Our tasks here are to 
show, first, how children survive and grow by consuming portions of the goods and 
services produced within those non-capitalist class structures, and second, how the arrival 
of children impacts both the non-capitalist class structures inside the household and the 
capitalist class structures outside. Achieving these tasks will, we believe, yield a class 
analysis of the mass of children who are not wage-earners or property owners.  
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We assume, to start simply, that the husband alone sells his labor power outside 
the household for a wage, a value received in exchange for his labor power. Later in the 
argument we shall assume that the wife also sells her labor power externally. Suppose 
they have a child. The survival and growth of the child - at least to some minimum age - 
depends in part on its care including a flow of goods and services that the child 
consumes. In so far as these goods and services have values – in the sense of embodying 
quantities of socially necessary abstract labor time - we can conceive of childcare in 
value terms.3  
Our class analysis of children will also provisionally assume a household in which 
the feudal class process connects husband and wife. Thus, the wife performs necessary 
labor – whose fruits she consumes to sustain herself – and also surplus labor whose fruits 
are appropriated by her husband. She is “exploited” in the precise sense that someone 
other than herself immediately appropriates the surplus portion of her labor (or its fruits).4 
The class process here – the production and (exploitative) appropriation of the surplus – 
takes a feudal form since it occurs within a personal bond (marriage) relation rather than 
a contract (wage/market) relation or a slave (ownership) relation. The wife performs 
necessary household labor in such concrete forms as cooking, shopping, cleaning, and 
repairing whose products she consumes. She also performs surplus labor which may take 
the same concrete forms yielding products appropriated by her husband or else her 
surplus labor may produce a different set of concrete goods and services. For example, 
before a child arrives into such a feudal class-structured household, the wife may have 
performed surplus labor yielding cooked meals, washed clothes, cleaned space, and 
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repaired furniture, while afterward, part or all of her surplus labor may take the concrete 
form of child care.5   
In any case, it is the husband (qua feudal lord) who appropriates her surplus labor 
(qua feudal serf) in the particular concrete forms shaped by the internal and external 
conditions of their household. Our analysis of a child’s arrival into such a feudal 
household begins by provisionally assuming that nothing else changes in that household. 
The wife, we will further assume, has been socially conditioned to respond to the child’s 
needs for household goods and services (food, clothing, shelter, cleaning, etc.) by 
devoting time to producing or otherwise securing them. Thus, in addition to the necessary 
labor she performs for her own sustenance and the surplus labor she performs to provide 
specific goods and services to her feudal husband, she must now do additional labor, 
namely child care. Since she does not consume the fruits of such additional labor, this 
additional labor represents her increased exploitation within the household’s feudal class 
structure. The more children, the greater her additional exploitation if nothing else in the 
household class structure changes. In effect, the wife is delivering more surplus labor to 
her husband in the concrete form of child care. 
Such increased exploitation of the wife-become-mother underscores the 
pertinence of the cultural, political, and emotional pressures in her social context that 
make her provide childcare as additional surplus labor. Her socially conditioned self-
definition comes into play alongside those of her husband, relatives, and friends to shape 
her conceptions of and attitudes toward child care. Whether undertaken with happiness 
and eagerness or merely acquiescence or even resentment, the additional exploitation will 
affect her and her relationships. The nature of those affects will depend partly but only 
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partly on whether she is conscious of her exploitation or not. Indeed, her continued 
exploitation may well require that she be unconscious of it and perhaps of the very 
concept of exploitation per se. For example, extending our argument (Fraad, Resnick and 
Wolff 1994) that specific concepts of love operated to sustain feudal class structures in 
US households, child care too may be conceptualized as a matter of parental love having 
no relationship to class or exploitation.   
While the impact of children arriving in feudal households may entail the 
increased exploitation of the wife, that is not necessarily the case. Consider some simple 
value equations. Dividing the wife’s day into laboring and non-laboring portions, she has 
twenty-four hours to allocate among her feudal necessary labor time – NL (F) – her 
feudal surplus labor time – SL (F) – and a residual time – R. The R term refers in the 
broadest sense to the time she spends sleeping, eating, contemplating, playing, and so 
forth. Her twenty-four hour time equation may thus be expressed as follows:  
1. 24 = NL (F) + SL (F) + R.   
We can measure the products of her necessary and surplus labor [NL (F) + SL (F)] in 
terms of the socially necessary abstract labor time embodied in them. In so doing, we 
borrow and extend Marx’s notion of the labor time embodied in products as constituting 
their “values”. Thus, the wife adds a total value by her labor inside the household that 
equals NL(F) + SL(F); we refer to the value added by the wife, since the total value of 
the outputs of her household labor also contain the values of the tools, equipment, and 
raw materials used up in and by her household production. She receives back and 
consumes only NL (F) worth of the household goods and services that she produces. She 
delivers SL (F) to her husband, as labor or as the products of such labor. The value that 
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her household labor adds thus exceeds the value of the household products she consumes 
to reproduce her household labor power. Because the first receiver (i.e., appropriator) of 
the wife’s surplus labor - SL (F) – is not she herself but another and different person, her 
husband, he is therefore what Marx refers to/defines as an exploiter. In this instance, he is 
an exploiter within the feudal class structure of the household. 
Using these simple equations, let us reconsider the impact of a child added to such 
a feudal class-structured household. If we assume no change in the wife’s necessary 
household labor or in her consumption of its fruits, then sustaining children would require 
either of two household adjustments or possibly some combination of them. In the first 
sort of adjustment, the wife performs more surplus labor, SL (F), so as to deliver care to 
the child. In the second sort of adjustment, her SL (F) remains unchanged, but one 
portion of it stops taking the concrete forms it took before children (e.g., cooking, 
cleaning, etc for the husband’s consumption) and instead shifts to the concrete forms of 
child care.   
The first adjustment was what we assumed initially in this discussion of children: 
their arrival increases the feudal wife’s rate of exploitation (SL (F)/NL (F)). This 
adjustment requires that she reduce her R. Thus, rising exploitation and fewer hours 
sleeping, eating, or merely finding a peaceful moment during the day to rest her body and 
mind are among the costs she incurs in this adjustment of the feudal household to the 
arrival of children. The adjustment may occur consciously or unconsciously, as the result 
of the husband’s dictates to his wife or as the parents’ cooperative execution of social 
norms they have both respectfully internalized.  
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The fundamental class dimensions of the household refer to the production and 
appropriation of the household surplus labor. Hence we focus here on the provision of 
child care within the class structure of the husband-wife relation and do not pursue the 
impact on the children of their consumption of a portion of the household’s output of 
goods and services. We use the term “gift” to underscore that child care (the value flow 
of household labor and products to children) is not itself a part of a class process. It is a 
non-class process (as are, for example, loans among workers, gifts to elderly parents, etc.) 
that interacts with and affects class processes but is different from them. In our discussion 
above, the child does not perform, appropriate, distribute, or receive a distributed share of 
the surplus. The wife produces and the husband appropriates all her surplus. When the 
child arrives, she produces more surplus which takes the form of goods and services that 
are then gifted to the child.  
To accommodate the arrival of children, the delivery to them of goods and 
services has been undertaken in the household by means of this first possible adjustment 
of its feudal class structure. Of course, the social context will overdetermine whether, 
when and how children arrive and whether and how goods and services will be delivered 
for their care. To the extent that this first adjustment is replicated with the arrival of more 
children, then the greater will be the mother’s exploitation and the reduction of her R. 
Because we think very many US women still live and work within feudal households 
with children, it is often such increased feudal class exploitation that sustains those 
children. Similarly, when that increased exploitation undercuts mothers’ ability or 
willingness to perform more household labor (or to stay married), such household feudal 
class structures (and the marriages that began them) could be undermined. 
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  A second and different adjustment of the household feudal class structure to the 
arrival of children is also possible. For various reasons, including wives/mothers refusing 
greater exploitation and reduced R, the value flow for child care may occur without the 
increased exploitation of wives/mothers. In this case and again referring to our simple 
equation, a child’s arrival and the consequent flow of value in the form of child care does 
not entail increased exploitation of the wife within the household’s feudal class structure 
– no increase in SL (F) nor any reduction of her R. If we further assume that no change 
occurs either in her NL (F) – that she continues to produce and consume the same value 
of her household production of goods and services – then the child care must involve a 
change within the SL (F).  That is, a portion of the wife’s pre-child surplus labor that took 
the form of, say, cleaning, cooking, providing sexual services, etc. for the husband, will 
be switched after the child arrives to performing child care.6 Instead of the latter requiring 
increased exploitation of the wife, it is rather that she alters the kinds of labor (and hence 
the mix of products) that comprise the feudal wife’s unchanged quantity of surplus labor 
provided.  The larger social context will determine whether husbands are persuaded 
and/or pressured to arrange or accept this second possible adjustment of a feudal class 
structured household to the arrival of children. As with the first adjustment, the second 
may be undertaken consciously or unconsciously; the existence of alternative possible 
adjustments may or may not be recognized by either partner. 
Still other adjustments are also possible. For example, assuming no change in the 
wife’s division of her day into NL (F), SL (F), and R, another way for child care to occur 
could entail the wife no longer consuming all the products of her necessary household 
labor. She reduces her own consumption to provide child care. Of course, to the extent 
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that such a value flow would jeopardize the reproduction of the wife’s serf labor power, it 
would undermine the feudal class structure of the household. 
Yet another possible adjustment to the child’s arrival in a feudal household may 
be that the father undertakes some childcare labor alongside his wife or instead of her 
doing such labor. While we examine below possible class and non-class consequences 
arising from father’s added household labor, we can say here that were father’s labor to 
produce some or all of the child care required by the arrival of the child, it could 
correspondingly relieve at least some of the disruptive pressures of the other possible 
adjustments to the child’s arrival. In this way, the father’s performance of childcare labor 
might not only sustain the child but also reinforce the feudal class structure of the 
household. 
For completeness, we need finally to consider yet another possible adjustment of 
the feudal class-structured household to a child’s arrival. A rise in the productivity of the 
wife’s labor (for example, by providing her with improved tools, appliances, etc.) may 
occur. Then, during the same number of hours of labor, wives may be able to produce a 
larger quantity of goods and services. To the extent that increased productivity provided 
the goods and services for child care, the other adjustments described above could be less 
difficult for and less disruptive of the household’s feudal class structure. Of course, since 
improving household labor productivity typically involves and results from buying 
appliances, it requires outlays from the husband’s cash income from work outside the 
household. That would set in motion other problems for the household considered below 
in our discussion of household budgets.  Finally, if their increased productivity results in 
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wives spending fewer hours on products they consume and more on those delivered to 
their husbands, then the result would be an increased rate of feudal wives’ exploitation. 
The most likely adjustments of feudal class structured households to children’s 
arrival will be those that reflect the customs, laws, and religions dominant in the US 
today (shaping, for example, the emotional needs, expectations, and taboos of wives and 
husbands). Thus, while productivity increases and childcare labor by fathers are possible, 
those adjustments, when they have occurred, seem rarely to have sufficed. Caring for 
children arriving in contemporary feudal households continues to depend on various 
combinations of increases in women’s surplus labor (rising rates of household 
exploitation), reductions in their own consumption levels, and decreases in their non-
laboring time (R) within their households.7   
These consequences for mothers risk their mental and physical exhaustion and 
their alienation from their children, their husbands, and even from the family as a socially 
celebrated institution. To the extent that wives (and also husbands) lack any 
consciousness that their children’s arrival has complicated and strained the household’s 
feudal class structure, they will lack the concepts and vocabulary to address the class 
aspects of their problems. Hence they will be less likely to change their households’ class 
structures, even though those very structures contribute to the tensions they otherwise 
experience. Instead, spouses will more likely blame each other and/or the children for the 
alienation, exhaustion, and interpersonal ambivalences that so often follow children’s 
arrival. Continuing the tragedy, when those children reach adulthood they too will more 
likely blame their parents, ignore class, and so perpetuate the situation generationally. 
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 Children thus impose particular personal costs on mothers and fathers living 
inside households with feudal class structures – alongside the opportunities they also 
present for parents to nurture, care, and both love and be loved by them. Mothers 
especially are generally expected to absorb those costs willingly. If they are not conscious 
of their rising feudal exploitation and its effects on the rest of the family and thus on the 
larger society too, that does not diminish its impact. Thus it not surprising those children 
at home are often victimized emotionally and physically by mothers and fathers who are 
themselves physically and emotionally stressed by the overwork they often recognize and 
the class exploitation they rarely do. In addition, children’s arrival into a feudal 
household class structure also puts complex new demands and hence strains on its 
monetary arrangements. Feudal households must always balance the money inflows from 
the external sale of husbands’ and wives’ labor powers with the monetary outflows 
needed to reproduce not only the labor powers they each sell but also the household’s 
internal feudal class structure. Children’s arrival places new demands on that balancing 
process and thereby affects households and families in yet more ways. Thus we turn next 
to households and money. 
 
Class interactions between households and enterprises  
 
 One consequence of recognizing households’ distinctive class structures is that 
social theory has a new and no longer avoidable task. Grasping any society’s dynamic 
henceforth requires taking account of the interactions between class structures inside 
households and those outside, e.g. in enterprises (Gibson-Graham 1996 particularly ch.9). 
Understanding individuals and groups likewise now requires exploring how the multiple 
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class structures that their lives engage, at home and at work, interact to shape their 
experiences, interrelationships, and consciousness. Individuals participate in different 
class structures, within their lifetimes and often within each day. Goods and services flow 
among these different class structures. The multiple class structures of any society are 
thus complexly interdependent. Changes in any one class structure will change the others 
and the interactions among them. Class changes will in turn alter all the non-class 
structures and processes that comprise the social context of class. When children are 
introduced into the household’s class structure, its resulting changes ramify socially.  
 While various literatures explore other aspects of the complex relations between 
households and enterprises, all are virtually silent about how the production, 
appropriation, and distributions of surpluses occur differently in households and 
enterprises. They do not investigate why, when, and how surpluses flow between the 
class structures of household and enterprise, nor do they follow the social consequences 
of those flows. Thus, the contradictions besetting the class structures of households and 
enterprises and the relationship between them remain largely unrecognized in the 
contemporary families who struggle to manage those contradictions and their effects. Our 
goals here are to add class-qua-surplus analyses of households and enterprises to the 
existing literatures and to extend class consciousness generally.  
 Every class structure requires preconditions if it is to begin and ongoing 
conditions of existence if it is to be reproduced over time. As preconditions for any 
particular class structure to occur in a society’s production activities, we may mention (1) 
that the requisite tools, equipment, and raw materials must be made available to 
commence such production, and (2) that laborers must be willing, able, and interested in 
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beginning to produce and deliver a surplus to the appropriators in that particular class 
structure. As ongoing conditions of existence of any particular class structure, used up 
means of production must be replenished and laborers must continue to produce and 
deliver surpluses to its appropriators. Additional ongoing conditions of existence include 
that the produced surplus must be quantitatively sufficient to enable its appropriators to 
distribute portions sufficient to secure all those conditions of the class structure’s 
reproduction that would not otherwise be secured. And finally, the surplus must either 
take – or be easily changed into – the qualitative form(s) needed to secure those 
conditions. That is, the surplus must be distributed in a form acceptable to those 
recipients who provide the needed conditions of the class structure’s reproduction. In 
more formal theoretical terms, the class structure’s commencement and reproduction 
require that its preconditions and then its ongoing conditions be realized. 
Once any particular class structure’s preconditions have been realized and it 
comes into existence, its reproduction is threatened if and when any of its ongoing 
conditions of existence is withdrawn. For example, if, within any class structure, its 
productive workers refuse to continue to produce surpluses or to deliver them to the 
surplus appropriators, then that class structure’s continued existence is rendered 
problematical. If the tools, equipment, and raw material used up in production are not 
replenished, that will also jeopardize the class structure. Similar jeopardy would attach to 
a class structure if the appropriators lack sufficient surplus to distribute the requisite 
portions to secure its conditions of existence. Finally, to take another example especially 
germane to the rest of this discussion, if a class structure generates a surplus that is 
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qualitatively unacceptable to its intended recipients, then that class structure is 
threatened.  
This last is precisely the existential dilemma of the feudal class structures of 
households when they are located within today’s highly monetized societies. The 
household’s feudal class structure typically has several conditions of existence that can be 
secured only with money disbursements, yet the wife inside the household produces and 
delivers to her husband a surplus that is usually in-kind rather than in monetary form. 
These money disbursements pose a basic problem which has to be solved for the feudal 
class structure of the household to survive within a monetized, capitalist enterprise 
economy. For example, the wife’s feudal surplus labor requires a physical space in which 
to work; the family home is a condition of existence of the feudal class structure within it. 
To secure the family home, the husband and wife perhaps undertake a mortgage loan that 
requires money payments to the mortgage lender out of the household’s feudal surplus. 
Alternatively, they may rent the living space that enables their household’s feudal class 
structure. Obliged then to make rental payments – necessarily in money form – they face 
the problem that their household surplus does not take the requisite money form. Other 
examples include possible taxes levied on the feudal households and interest payments on 
loans to the household.   
Even before the problem arose of money payments needed to secure certain of the 
feudal household’s ongoing conditions of existence, there were the money payments 
needed to secure the preconditions of the feudal household’s coming into existence. That 
is, money was typically needed to make initial purchases of the tools, equipment, and raw 
materials to begin a feudal household (and then, of course, to replenish them regularly 
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thereafter). In sum, feudal households, both to begin and to continue, must make a variety 
of money payments.  
 However, one distinction that differentiates the feudal household from the 
industrial capitalist enterprise is that while the latter’s class structure is usually fully 
monetized, inside the feudal household produced goods and services rarely take a 
monetary form. Thus the problem for the existing feudal class structures inside 
households – if they are to coexist with capitalist enterprises outside – is that they must 
make money payments while they do not generate money incomes.8 The general solution 
typical in modern societies has been to work out household budgets that co-mingle 
monetized and non-monetized components from both class structures, the feudal inside 
the household and the capitalist outside. Yet, like all solutions, the budgetary solution is 
contradictory as it generates new problems and tensions even as it resolves old ones. 
 To explore the household budget and the feudal/capitalist class structures it 
encompasses, we make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the husband 
is the only household member who earns money income from outside the household. Our 
argument can easily be extended below to accommodate today’s more usual situation 
where wives also do wage work outside the household. Second, and also only for 
simplicity, we assume the husband sells his labor power to an industrial capitalist. Our 
argument could be modified for any other mode of earning money outside the household. 
Given these simplifying assumptions, it follows that the husband’s money wages must be 
the source for those monetary payments required to secure the conditions of existence of 
the feudal class structure of his household. 
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The husband’s money wages flow into the household’s composite budget. A 
portion of those money wages then flows out as expenditures to purchase the tools, 
equipment, and raw materials that replenish, upgrade, or supplement those used up in 
household production and to secure those ongoing conditions of existence of its feudal 
class structure that require money payments. In effect, the household budget 
accomplishes a transfer of money from the husband’s participation in the capitalist 
enterprise to the reproduction of its feudal class structure. The problem of the qualitative 
form (non-monetary) of the feudal household’s surplus has been solved by this budgetary 
transfer. In this way, the household budget effectively encompasses and integrates the 
feudal and capitalist class participations of household members. 
 However, this budgetary transfer solution raises new problems of its own. In the 
simple feudal household we have assumed, the transfer diverts a portion of the husband’s 
wage income to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure. The question thus 
arises: how does this wage diversion affect the husband? Our answer draws on Marx’s 
classic definition of the value of labor power as equal to the sum of values of the 
commodities workers customarily demand to reproduce their labor power. Like Marx, we 
assume, for expository simplicity, that the wages employers pay for the labor power they 
buy from workers equals the value of that labor power. Thus, diverting a portion of the 
father’s wages to secure his feudal household will prevent him from buying and 
consuming the full set of commodities customarily needed to reproduce the labor power 
he sells to his employer. This is a problem for the capitalist enterprise that employs him 
because a husband’s reduced consumption may jeopardize his continued productivity and 
hence employability (because of deteriorated physical, psychological, and/or emotional 
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well-being). The husband’s reduced consumption also presents risks to the household, 
since if he consequently lost his job in the capitalist enterprise, that would undermine the 
household budget and hence the household altogether. If children were added to the 
feudal household, likely requiring still more monetary payments to secure their places 
within the household class structure, further pressures for diverting the husband’s wages 
might well ensue and thus cause further problems for both class structures. 
 The general response to the problems raised by the transfer of some of the 
husband’s wages to securing the household’s feudal class structure has been to 
compensate him by diverting to his consumption a portion of the feudal household 
surplus. This compensation entails a reverse transfer. In the first transfer, money wages 
from the father’s participation in the capitalist class structure of the enterprise are 
transferred to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure. In the compensating 
reverse transfer, a portion of the feudal household’s surplus labor, embodied in non-
monetized goods and services, is consumed by the father to reproduce the labor power he 
sells to the capitalist employer. One transfer reproduces the household’s members’ 
participation in its internal feudal class structure, while the other reproduces the 
household’s members’ participation in an external capitalist class structure. 
 These internal transfers of the household budget make it one site of the class 
contradictions in the relation between household and enterprise in many contemporary 
societies. Husband and wife will not always agree on which household conditions of 
existence require monetary payments, how large each of such payments should be, when 
the payments should be made, etc. They may dispute the portion of the husband’s wages 
to be used to purchase commodities for the reproduction of his labor power or the portion 
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of the household surplus to be provided for the husband’s consumption. Husband and 
wife have different relations to and dependencies upon the two opposing transfers within 
the household budget. The differences and tensions resulting from these contradictions 
can aggravate, disrupt, and even fragment households. The arrival of children and 
possibly other adults into such households will further complicate and perhaps aggravate 
their contradictions and tensions.  
 If the lives of the wife and children revolve mostly around the feudal household, 
they may well favor its well-being by supporting a household budget that transfers more 
of the husband’s wages away from expenditures to reproduce his labor power. If the 
husband, whose life is split between two class structures, is more invested for cultural 
reasons in his capitalist employment, he may well resent the deflected wages and view 
household budget priorities very differently. The husband who seeks more surplus labor 
from his wife to compensate for the wages he uses to support the feudal household may 
find her resistant. Children may enhance her resistance and eventually weigh in on her 
side of such conflicts with the husband. In short, household budgeting is replete with 
class dimensions and contradictions. 
 The husband must reproduce his labor power to be able to sell it again and thus 
ensure his income and his social position. He uses his wages to do that. He has certain 
conscious or unconscious ambivalences about marriage and household and children. He 
is culturally disposed, in most circumstances, to want them, yet he also senses the 
difficulties their sustenance will provoke for him as they likely did in his family of origin. 
The feudal wife is more intimately connected to the household’s maintenance and likely, 
again for cultural reasons, to appreciate its importance for the family more than the 
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husband does. The children developing inside such class-conflicted households will 
exhibit all manner of complex responses to how each parent struggles in and with those 
conflicts. The children’s responses will, in turn, shape their own later adult engagements 
with the class contradictions connecting their households and enterprises. Just as those 
class contradictions shape the personal interactions and relationships between husband 
and wife, they do likewise, albeit in different ways, for the children growing up in such 
households. 
Negotiations among family members may achieve some at least temporary 
compromise regarding monetized feudal subsumed class payments and the 
accommodating transfers within the household budget. However, changes within the two 
class structures as well as non-class changes affecting household members undermine 
and disrupt such compromises. The class contradictions of contemporary households 
constantly shape their trials and tribulations and their lasting impacts on all its members. 
Class contradictions thus ramify their effects across the social landscape. Because those 
effects include serious social costs, we presume that rendering the class contradictions 
visible and explicit will give modern society a better chance to deal with if not reduce 
those costs. Our household class analysis provokes especially this new question about 
contemporary household-enterprise interactions and their social effects: what sorts of 
class changes in both households and enterprises might yield preferable social results? 
  
Class complexities of the household budget 
To further unpack the mutual dependency between the class structures of feudal 
household and capitalist enterprise, and to set the stage for much of the rest of this paper, 
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we propose a simple value analysis of the flows between them. To summarize our 
argument so far, namely that the husbands in our simplified narrative have one foot in 
(enterprise) capitalism and another in (household) feudalism, we offer a simple 
inequality.  Inequality 2 below slightly modifies Marx’s similar formulation for the value 
of labor power in Capital, Vol. 1. It does this by taking into account the fact that the value 
of labor power received by the husband - V (CAP) – does not suffice for both the 
reproduction of his labor power and the monetized payments required to secure the 
conditions of existence of his feudal household. 
2. V (CAP) < Cc (CAP) + YHB  
Here, V (CAP) stands for the value of the husband’s labor power sold to the capitalist 
enterprise (presumed to equal his money wage). These wages are understood to flow into 
the household budget as its monetized income. Following Marx, V (CAP) is defined as 
equal to the value of all the commodities he must customarily purchase and consume to 
reproduce his labor power (i.e., V (CAP) = EV/UV x UV where EV/UV stands for the 
unit value of each customarily consumed commodity and UV stands for the entire bundle 
of such commodities). Let us define Cc (CAP) as this value the husband must spend on 
such customarily consumed commodities to reproduce his labor power: Cc (CAP) ≡ 
EV/UV x UV. Finally, YHB stands for the portion of the husband’s wages diverted away 
from commodity purchases for his own consumption and used instead to (1) purchase 
tools, equipment, and raw materials (appliances, children’s’ clothing and toys, raw food, 
etc.) to replenish those used up in the wife’s household production, and (2) secure certain 
conditions of existence of the household’s feudal class structure (rent, insurance 
premiums, and property taxes on the feudal home; donations to the church; expenditures 
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on childcare such as children’s clothing, diapers, carriages, cribs, toys, and baby-food, 
etc).9   As in all of the following equations and inequalities, the variables here are 
measurable in the usual “value” (i.e., socially necessary abstract labor) terms. 
Clearly, if YHB were zero – for example, an unmarried male wage-earner living 
alone who spends all his wages on commodities for his personal consumption – then  
V (CAP) = Cc (CAP). Likewise, if YHB > 0, then only part of the husband’s wage is 
available to purchase only part of the commodities he needs to consume to reproduce his 
labor power.  
The inequality sign in expression 2 above follows from Marx’s value assumption, 
namely that the value of labor power equals the abstract labor necessary to produce the 
bundle of commodities (EV/UV x UV) whose consumption will just reproduce the 
husband’s labor power. Thus, once the wage-earner uses some part of his wages for 
purposes other than buying commodities to reproduce his labor power, Marx’s equation 
converts into the inequality of expression 2.10 If wages equal the value of the husband’s 
labor power, then they cannot pay for both the reproduction of his labor power and the 
payments included in the YHB term that reproduce the household’s feudal class 
structure.11 Using any portion of the husband’s money wages for the reproduction of the 
household’s feudal class structure (i.e., YHB > 0) reduces the commodities he can buy and 
consume, and that threatens the reproduction of his labor power.12 
In many countries, most male wage laborers live in households whose budgets use 
portions of their wages to secure conditions of existence of those households’ feudal class 
structures. Such household budgets thereby threaten capitalism. Indeed, the more 
pressing become the financial demands to support feudal households, including raising 
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children there, the stronger this threat becomes.13 Yet the husband whose participation in 
the capitalist class structure is threatened in this way is also the “head” of the household, 
the appropriator of the feudal surplus produced within it. He is, in short, torn between the 
contending demands and rewards of his positions within the two class structures that his 
life engages. The need to purchase commodities to reproduce his labor power contradicts 
the need to fund his household, to “support his family” there. Moreover, this 
contradictory tension in the husband is no doubt communicated to and shared by wife and 
children; indeed it becomes woven into the culture of the larger society.  We suspect that 
the demands of family and children today, as compared, say, to Marx’s day, tip the 
balance such that now relatively more of the husband’s wages are diverted to securing the 
feudal household.  
This change in household budgeting arose alongside the historical development of 
a new world-view of the family and children. Modern capitalism is increasingly viewed 
as resting ultimately on the strength of “an underlying family structure.” More than 
before, children are conceived of and treated as cherished wards there. Earlier 
capitalism’s harsh treatment of children (so aptly described by Engels) contributed to this 
evolution. New discourses arose that not only documented abuses, but also produced 
children as new objects of social – legal, medical, economic, and above all family – 
concern and need.  Sensitivities changed as well, thereby helping to instill in wage-
earners a propensity to spend relatively more on family and childcare at the expense of 
commodities for personal consumption.14 Capitalism’s abuse of children in many “less 
developed countries” today evokes similar sentiments and reform movements aimed, at 
least in part, to “strengthen families and households.”  
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However, the household’s reproduction requires a balanced coexistence of its 
various members’ participations in both feudal and capitalist class structures. The threat 
to the husband’s reproduction of his labor power must somehow be compensated or 
offset. Otherwise a threatened capitalism will react back and threaten the household as 
well (for example, by dismissing male workers whose productivity falls as a result of 
their not adequately reproducing their labor power). As we shall show, the husband’s 
threatened labor power reproduction is partly offset by reorganizing the household’s 
internal feudal class structure to provide more of its output for the husband’s personal 
consumption.  
We begin our demonstration of this argument by introducing inequality 3 to 
represent the household feudal class structure in value terms. 
3. SL (F)NM + NCRM > SSCP (F)NM + SSCP (F)M  
SL (F)NM is the feudal household surplus labor (in “value” terms measured in abstract 
labor time) that husbands appropriate from their wives; the subscript NM indicates that 
this value takes a non-monetary form. NCRM represents the transfer of value (a “non-
class revenue” or NCR since it is neither a surplus appropriated nor one distributed) to 
the feudal household resulting from the diversion of a portion of the husband’s wages; the 
subscript M indicates that this value flow has a monetary form.15 On the right hand side 
of inequality 3, we have disaggregated the household’s feudal subsumed class payments, 
i.e. its outlays to secure the conditions of existence of its internal feudal class structure.16 
One portion, SSCP (F)NM, stands for those feudal subsumed class distributions that take a 
non-monetary form. The remaining portion, SSCP (F)M represents those subsumed class 
distributions that must be made in cash. As argued above, in most modern societies, this 
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latter portion is substantial and may well exceed the former. The inequality results 
because the husband transfers a portion of the monetized value he received from 
capitalist employment into the feudal household to finance its feudal cash requirements. 
This inflow of value from capitalism to the feudal household enables household revenues 
to exceed required expenditures.  
 Inequality 3 shows how the functioning of the feudal household depends partly on 
capitalism, specifically the diversion of husband’s wages partly to sustain his household’s 
feudal class structure. We show next how this very dependence yields a return flow of 
value to help reproduce the husband’s labor power. This return flow is accomplished 
when the husband acquires for his own consumption a portion of his wife’s feudal surplus 
labor inside the household. That consumption helps to reproduce his labor power; it 
compensates for the diversion of his wages within the household budget. The household 
budget has thus accomplished two value transfers: (1) the diversion of wages derived 
from a capitalist class structure (enterprise) for expenditures to support a feudal class 
structure (household) and (2) the diversion of a portion of the surplus in the feudal class 
structure (household) to help reproduce the labor power sold to a capitalist class structure 
(enterprise).  
 While unlikely, it is possible that the two opposing value transfers are exactly 
equal. We may express such an equality viewed from the vantage point of the feudal 
household as equation 4:   
4. SL (F)NM + NCRM = SSCP (F)NM + SSCP (F)M + YNM 
The newly introduced variable, YNM, represents the non-monetized portion of the wife’s 
feudal surplus labor diverted to help reproduce the husband’s labor power. This diversion 
 27
diminishes what remains of the wife’s feudal surplus available to secure household 
feudalism’s conditions of existence (i.e., SSCP (F)NM). The equal sign in Equation 4 
signals that what the household’s reproduction suffers by providing YNM for the 
husband’s personal consumption is exactly offset by what the husband suffers by 
providing NCRM for the household’s reproduction at the expense of reproducing his own 
labor power.  
Equation 5 shows the same result considered from the vantage point of the 
husband as wage laborer: 
5.        V (CAP) - YHB + YNM = Ĉc (CAP) + CH    
On the equation’s left hand side is the husband’s money wage income, V (CAP), minus 
the portion of his money wage diverted to the budget for securing the feudal household’s 
reproduction, YHB, plus the portion of value transferred to his personal consumption from 
the feudal household, YNM.  On the right hand side is the husband’s new level of 
consumption: the value of commodities he can actually buy with the portion of his wages 
not diverted to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure, Ĉc (CAP), plus the 
portion of his wife’s feudal surplus labor (non-monetized) diverted for his personal 
consumption to reproduce his labor power, CH. Assuming, as we have, that this value 
inflow, YNM, equals the value outflow, YHB, then what the husband suffers by the reduced 
purchase of commodities, Ĉc (CAP), is exactly balanced by what he gains in feudal 
household consumption, CH.   
Class contradictions between households and enterprises 
Equations 4 and 5 allow us to pinpoint the tensions surrounding the household’s 
attempt to integrate external capitalist wage labor and internal feudal production. To the 
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degree that the value transferred from feudal household surplus to the husband’s 
reproduction of his labor power, YNM, is less than YHB (the reverse transfer of the 
husband’s wages to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure), the husband’s total 
consumption falls. Tensions then may arise among husbands, wives, and children over 
supporting the household versus reproducing the husband’s labor power. Needless to say, 
were YNM instead greater than YHB tensions might well arise provoked by wives and 
children whose household lives were pinched by such an inequality (the rise in the 
husband’s total consumption). Indeed, with or without consciousness that these transfers 
occur, household members’ conceptions and measurements of household circumstances 
may well clash. Then, too, changes inside the household’s feudal class structure or inside 
the enterprise’s capitalist class structure will convert these equations into inequalities 
provoking further tensions. One way the household might try to ameliorate all such 
tensions would be through raising the wife’s productivity: purchasing more efficient tools 
and equipment to enable more household output from the same labor time. However, as 
noted earlier, raising household productivity has its own limits and contradictions; it 
offers no guarantees that it can reduce households’ class tensions. 
 Equation 5 can also clarify the alternative household reactions if and when 
changes occur in either the feudal or the capitalist class structures that the household 
engages. As one example, we may consider possible consequences if the husband’s wage 
falls. One possibility is that he simply accepts reduced personal consumption: he buys 
fewer commodities and nothing else in the household budget changes. Of course, such a 
consequence undermines the labor power he offers for sale to capitalists and also reduces 
the wage-earner’s demand for capitalist commodities: in short, problems for the 
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reproduction of the capitalist class structure ensue. A second possible consequence of the 
husband’s falling wages is that he may demand or command a larger YNM to offset his 
diminished wage. If all else remains the same, the wife must perform more surplus labor 
(in equation 4) and deliver its fruits to her husband for his personal consumption (CH in 
equation 5). Increased household exploitation is then the “compensation” for the 
husband’s fallen wages, but it will also provoke all manner of problems for the household 
with spill-over effects on the husband at work. A third possibility is that the wife will not 
perform additional surplus labor in the household to enhance the husband’s personal 
consumption; rather she may reduce some kinds of the surplus labor done before the 
husband’s wages fell (e.g., child care) and substitute instead other kinds (e.g., personal 
services for the husband). In such cases, children’s vulnerability to their households’ 
efforts to integrate their feudal and capitalist class engagements/dependencies may be 
abused. Beyond these illustrative examples, there are, of course, many other external 
changes that can and do impact such households, just as there are other possible 
household reactions to such changes           
Equations 4 and 5 can also serve as frameworks for examining how other sorts of 
changes can affect the contradictory relationship between household feudalism and 
enterprise capitalism. For example, if the husband reduced the portion of his money 
wages made available to reproduce his household’s feudal class structure and/or if the 
household’s reproduction suddenly became more expensive (higher home maintenance 
costs, property taxes, children’s school fees, etc.) the household’s feudal class structure 
would be jeopardized. Without one or another compensating adjustment in the terms of 
Equation 4, the household might dissolve or disperse and thereby set in motion secondary 
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consequences for capitalist enterprises. For example, rising household costs may lead the 
wife to sell her labor power to a capitalist employer as well (“to solve the family’s 
financial problems”). However, that decision will also generate new problems. Will such 
a wife simply add her wage labor outside the household to the necessary and surplus 
feudal labor she performs inside (the famous “double shift”)? If she does, how will her 
physical and mental health be affected and likewise the qualities and quantities of her 
household labor? If she does not, will she reduce her necessary and/or her surplus 
household labor, and with what consequences for the reproduction of the feudal 
household, for child care, and so on? 
In summary, the relationship between traditional feudal households and capitalism 
is contradictory. Household feudalism simultaneously supports and undermines 
enterprise capitalism. When husbands sell their labor power to capitalist enterprises (and 
indeed when their wives do as well), they spend their wages partly to create and maintain 
their households. In this way, enterprise capitalism supports household feudalism. At the 
same time, using part of their wages in this way threatens capitalism by undermining the 
reproduction of the labor power that capitalist enterprises must buy and on which they 
depend to produce and appropriate the surplus (generating their profits). Likewise, when 
household feudal class structures generate surpluses used in part for husbands’ and 
wives’ personal consumption (helping them to reproduce the labor power they sell 
externally), it is household feudalism that supports enterprise capitalism. At the same 
time, using household feudal surpluses in that way makes them unavailable to secure the 
conditions of existence of household feudalism, thereby undermining it. Given that the 
class structures of households and enterprises are interdependent, undermining either 
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threatens the other. Moreover class structures are interdependent with all the other 
structures inside households and enterprises (political structures, cultural structures, and 
so on). Thus, our focused examination of the class contradictions between households 
and enterprises yields a new vantage point for social analysis and new insights into the 
contemporary problems and dynamics of both social sites.  
We may illustrate the contradictions between household and enterprise class 
structures by examining the recent wage depression in the US.  Since the mid 1970s, US 
workers have endured by far the worst three decades of real wage changes in the nation’s 
history (at least since the 1820s). In most of the last thirty years, real wages fell; across 
the period as a whole, average real wages stagnated at best. Meanwhile, labor 
productivity rose rapidly, inside and outside the US, thereby dropping the prices of 
domestically produced and imported consumer goods. Money wages could be lowered in 
a variety of ways (outright cuts, shifts from full-time to part-time “temp” designations, 
restructuring job descriptions, etc.) partly because falling consumer goods prices 
cushioned the impact of falling money wages. Likewise, actual and potential outsourcing 
of US jobs, especially to Asia, and a ceaseless drumbeat of threats regarding the 
imperative “need” to cut wages to “protect jobs from leaving” had their impacts. US 
workers, inside and outside of unions, fearfully accepted the falling money wages 
(consoling themselves with lower prices in proliferating Wal-Marts and other discount 
stores). But most workers sank further under they weight of rightwing ideological 
hegemony and also accepted falling real wages alongside the work-place pressures that 
yielded rising labor productivity. 
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In Marxian terms, US capitalism thus succeeded in its most beloved of 
combinations over the last thirty years. The value paid to workers dropped while the 
value added by their labor rose.17 The quantity of surplus value appropriated by 
capitalists thus exploded. Not surprisingly, the stock market bubbled (and burst) in the 
usual hysteria of top corporate managers, shareholders, bankers, and others in positions to 
tap the surplus value explosion. In the process, the inequalities of wealth, income, 
political power and cultural access all widened significantly.  
The centerpiece and source of capitalist success in the last twenty five years was 
thus a rising rate of exploitation. The celebrants of that success, in business, government, 
and academic circles, could not see, let alone consider, its exploitative foundation. They 
spoke instead – and as always - about lean managements, entrepreneurship, and 
marvelous new technologies. Such self-serving celebrations precluded any serious 
examination – let alone class analysis - of rising exploitation’s social costs including 
especially the resulting stress and strain placed on American households. To illustrate the 
importance of what the celebrants missed and move our class analysis another step, we 
propose here a brief class analysis of how the recently rising exploitation affected 
households including children therein.  
For the many millions of US male workers who suffered a falling value of their 
labor power and of their real wages, they immediately confronted a personal as well as a 
household crisis. They had to cut their own personal consumption – an additional 
reduction in Ĉc (CAP) further jeopardizing the reproduction of their labor power – and/or 
to demand more household-produced goods and services for their personal consumption 
– a rise in CH thereby jeopardizing the reproduction of the household’s class structure. 
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Under these pressures, workers’ households responded in two major ways. First, they 
sent additional members of the household, chiefly wives, out to do additional wage work 
to increase the household budget’s inflow of cash. At the same time, partly because 
household budgets were so strained and partly because wives’ wage work imposed new 
costs on those budgets, US households also responded by enormously increased 
borrowing. 
Wives newly earning wages provided desperately needed additional monetary 
inflows to household budgets suffering from husbands’ falling wages.18  While this 
solved some of the problems imposed on household class structures, it also introduced 
new ones. On the one hand, wives’ wages helped households to secure the conditions of 
existence of their internal class structures that required cash outlays (which included 
rising interest payments on home mortgages/equity loans and credit card debt). In this 
way, wives’ additional wages offset the impact on household budgets of husbands’ 
reduced wages. Likewise, wives’ wages could finance husbands’ additional personal 
consumption as compensation for husbands contributing portions of their wages to 
household budgets. However, wives’ wages spent in these ways were unavailable to 
reproduce the labor power wives now sold to employers. That introduced new strains on 
marriages and households. 
However wives’ wages were spent, their wage labor introduced extraordinary 
extra burdens on them. If they maintained unchanged their household labor, necessary 
and surplus, and thereby their labor contributions to reproducing the household’s class 
structure, it meant that their wage work reduced their free time (“R” from our earlier 
equation and the “double shift” exposed by feminist writers across the last 30 years).19 
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The wives’ resulting physical and emotional exhaustion threatened the reproduction of 
household class structures and the reproduction of the wives’ newly marketed labor 
power. Such threats then spilled over to affect the husbands and children in ways that 
could and often did aggravate intra-family tensions that sometimes culminated in abuses 
(spousal, child, substance, etc.) and/or divorces that drew increased public attention 
across the last quarter century. 
An alternative, as noted above, was for the wives not to continue their internal 
household labor undiminished after they added external wage labor. Less household labor 
would assuage wives’ exhaustion, but it, too, introduced its own problems. If wives 
performed less necessary household labor, they thereby jeopardized the reproduction of 
the labor power they devoted to household work. If wives performed less household 
surplus labor, they thereby jeopardized the surplus available to reproduce the household’s 
class structure and/or to compensate the husband for the portion of his wages not used for 
his own consumption. Either option or any combination thereof would likely reduce the 
flow of values to sustain children, thereby threatening their physical and emotional 
development. It might also place new cash demands on the household budget, e.g. for 
purchased housecleaning and/or childcare services in lieu of the wife’s housework. 
Finally, husbands often accepted their wives’ entry into wage labor and their 
resulting needs to use a portion of their earnings to reproduce the labor power they sell to 
their employers. However, that usage of a portion of her earnings was often conceived as 
a “gift” from husband to wife for her consumption. In class terms such “gifts” represent 
rather the unconscious recognition that the household’s survival requires the reproduction 
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of all its income-generating activities: the wife’s no less than the husband’s labor power 
sold to external employers as well as the wife’s household surplus production. 
These evolving class contradictions plunged millions of American women into 
extremely difficult personal situations. Wage labor outside the household represented for 
many a significant advance (variously conceptualized as “independence,” “maturity,” 
“equality,” or “liberation”). Yet it also often meant increased stress and exhaustion, 
greater household exploitation, an irritating new dependence on husbands’ “gifts”, and 
enhanced anxieties over the accumulating household debts. Overstressed intra-household 
relations surfaced as intense feelings of guilt (over “time away from home” or “too little 
quality time with the kids”) or conflict (“the impossibility of combining career with 
family”) or animosity (“the spouse that does not understand” and “the kids/parents that 
seem so alien”). The households’ class dimensions and contradictions – in the surplus 
definition of class utilized here - remained unknown. Because class consciousness was 
mostly absent, Americans deployed non-class conceptualizations to express, account for, 
and respond to the problems and crises of US households. Because they could not “see” 
(theorize) class, they could not consider, let alone advocate, class changes in enterprises 
and/or households as parts of possible solutions to those problems and crises.  
Thus we confront the contemporary “dysfunctional family” ubiquitously 
displayed across the culture but never subjected to any class-qua-surplus analysis. On 
television and in films, household problems became ubiquitous themes for comedy and 
occasional objects for “psychological” explanations. Endless sermonizing advocated a 
return to idealized “family values” lost with traditional religion’s decline. Depression, 
obesity, and substance abuse have become endemic and serve often to “explain” 
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household problems and crises. The same applies to alienation between parents and 
children, husbands and wives, and among the rising number of single people (expressed 
in extreme personal difficulties with intimacy and trust). Yet the dominant cultural 
themes, while often recognizing something profoundly amiss in American households 
and family life, nonetheless stay clear of class analyses in general. The wide and deep 
repression of concepts of class in surplus terms keeps class changes in households and/or 
enterprises off the agendas for change, let alone action, in both popular and academic 
discourses on America’s problems and their possible solutions.   
As US households tried to cope with falling real wages by having wives enter the 
wage labor force, enterprises producing child care and house cleaning as commodities 
grew quickly. Every city and its suburbs display a growing array of childcare providers 
including day-care enterprises, nursery schools, after-school centers, hired nannies, near 
and extended family members, and neighborhood baby sitters. With the partial exception 
of family members, these diverse providers produce and sell child care as a commodity. 
Their enterprises display class structures ranging from the large to the small capitalist to 
the self-employed (what Marx called “ancient”). Equally dramatic has been the growth in 
small capitalist and ancient house cleaners. Given the relatively small capital and limited  
skills required and the low level of government regulation or oversight, housecleaning 
enterprises often employ illegal immigrants and especially young women.20 
Women’s wages are, on average, lower than men’s. Child care and house cleaning 
are often costly service commodities. These two circumstances add troubling 
complexities to the household-enterprise nexus. When feudal households respond to 
falling husband’s wages by then sending wives out to wage work, new problems arise 
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when households must then purchase childcare and housecleaning services. A painful 
question imposes itself on the family and especially on the wife. How large will the net 
cash inflow be after subtracting childcare and housecleaning purchases from wives’ 
disposable (i.e. after tax and other deductions) wage incomes? In almost all cases, the 
question – regardless of the answer – diminishes the wife’s wage contribution to the 
household budget and its overall viability as perceived by both husband and wife. And 
yet, comparable questions and calculations are rarely applied to the husband, even though 
both partners similarly straddle the same two class structures (capitalist enterprise and 
feudal household). A consciousness of the two class structures and their interdependence 
would yield a more balanced appreciation of this similarity as well as the key difference 
inside the household where wife produces and husband appropriates the surplus.  
So far we have assumed, to keep the analysis manageably simple, that the wife’s 
household childcare and cleaning labors occur within the framework of a feudal class 
process. When these services are instead purchased as commodities produced by others, 
wives are freed from a considerable amount of household labor (since both child care and 
cleaning are labor-intensive activities). They can reallocate the time freed from those 
labors to R, “free time” (to offset the exhaustion from her wage labor), or to other forms 
of work inside and/or outside the household. Thus, on the one hand, switching to the 
purchase of child care and cleaning is a partial offset to the contradictions and crisis of 
the household consequent upon falling wages as described above. Yet once again, this 
partial offset introduces new contradictions and problems. For example, reducing or 
eliminating the wife’s household childcare labor has its problematic consequences. 
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Child rearing plays a major role inculcating women into a life of nurturing and 
caring for the other. Supported as well by religion and the marriage contract, women and 
men alike often define women’s nature as serving the family inside the household. Such 
serving is also understood unconsciously to include the performance of surplus labor for 
her husband (Fraad 2000, 74). In this sense, a wife’s child care comprises one of the 
conditions of existence of household feudalism parallel to religious sermons about wifely 
duties, the banker’s provision of a mortgage loan to buy the home, the state’s provision of 
public services to homeowners, and so on.  
Clearly, if women take jobs outside the home and that reduces or eliminate their 
childcare work, the feudal household will be threatened unless, for example, childcare 
services are purchased. However, even if substitute child care is purchased to replace the 
work no longer done by the wage-earning wife, that raises new problems. First, husbands 
and wives may incur new anxieties and guilt because of the further distance from their 
children when paid child care is inserted into family life. Second, the wife’s reduced or 
eliminated childcare activities undermine one pillar of the feudal household: a waning of 
the conception of women as somehow inherently or naturally surplus performers for 
husbands. Not the least of the contradictions playing themselves out inside the 
contemporary American family is the rush of wives into the paid labor force to save their 
households (which it partly does) combined with the way that the resulting switch to 
purchased child care threatens their households (which it partly does). But, then again, it 
requires a class consciousness and a class analysis to be able to see, let alone address, 
such a contradiction. 
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Fathers’ household labor 
  We may now turn to another issue not yet addressed in the growing class 
analytical literature on households: the possibility that husbands, as well as wives, 
perform labor inside households (Cameron 1996/97, 2000; Gibson 1992, 44). Suppose 
that husbands, partly to offset the “double-shift” experienced by their wage-earning 
wives, undertake various household production activities such as cleaning, shopping, 
cooking and child care. From a class-analytic standpoint, such production activities must 
be questioned to determine whether and what kind of class processes may occur with 
them. In other words, do such husbands’ labors generate a surplus or not? If a surplus is 
produced, who appropriates and distributes it, and how is all this organized (i.e., in what 
particular kind of class structure does the husband’s household labor occur)? Answering 
these questions for the husband’s household labor will replicate the class analysis already 
undertaken for the feudal wife’s household labor. 
One possibility is that unlike the household labor of his wife the husband’s 
household labor entails no surplus production; it is not divisible into necessary and 
surplus components.21 He produces goods and services with or without household means 
of production and then distributes the output to himself and/or others as gifts. The 
following equation expresses such a husband’s utilization of his 24-hour day: 
6.            24 = NL (CAP) + SL (CAP) + Z (NC) + R     
where NL (CAP) and SL (CAP) stand respectively for the necessary and surplus labor 
time spent on his capitalist job; Z (NC) time spent on these new household duties (the 
letters NC signify non-class, i.e., the husband’s labor generates no surplus), and, as 
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before, R the residual non-laboring time spent sleeping, eating, contemplating, and so 
forth.  
If no class process occurs with the husband’s household labor, his Z (NC) yields 
produced wealth (goods and services) that he distributes among household members as a 
gift. Assuming no change in the length of the husband’s capitalist work day, for him to 
begin or increase Z (NC) requires him to reduce his R. On the one hand, beginning or 
increasing Z (NC) provides the household with additional wealth, while on the other it 
deprives the husband of non-labor time and the activities such time allowed. The specific 
historical and social conditions that combine to influence husbands to begin or increase Z 
(NC) will also shape what specific forms the resulting wealth takes (which goods and 
services husbands will produce), how the wealth is distributed, and how the husband’s 
production and distribution of that wealth impact the household and the larger society. 
In this context, we may consider why husbands in the US undertook household 
labor increasingly since the 1970s. The secular decline in most husbands’ real wages and 
the resulting need for their wives to enter into the capitalist labor force pressured 
husbands to perform (or perform more) household labor. Initially wives had simply added 
their wage labor outside the home to their necessary and surplus labor inside. But the 
resulting exhaustion and interpersonal strains changed expectations, needs, and demands. 
Gradually, husbands and wives changed their household division of labor. Wives 
continued to perform necessary and surplus labor within the household’s feudal class 
structure but less of such labor than before. Husbands, especially on weekends, undertook 
some or more heavy cleaning, yard work, household repairs, and child care. Of course, 
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social – and above all, cultural circumstances - determined the specifics differentiating 
each household (how much of what kind of labor husbands performed when). 
In many of those households, we find no reason to conceive of the husband’s 
labor as generating any surplus. In other words, the social context for such husbands’ 
household labor prevented any class process from occurring with that labor. That context 
– for example, the relevant laws, religious commitments, conceptions of marriage, and so 
on – had not much changed even while one particular internal aspect of household life 
had changed significantly, namely the husband’s work. Thus most wives continued in 
their feudal class position although sometimes tempered by some reduction of their total 
household labor time. The husband’s household labor then functioned as a kind of act of 
generosity or “commitment” to the family – above and beyond the wage income he 
brought in - producing goods and services he distributed for the household’s “needs.” No 
surplus was produced by or appropriated from such a husband’s household labor; that 
labor and its products were simply adjuncts to the household’s feudal class structure.  
We underscore this possibility for two reasons. First, by showing how husbands’ 
household work can take either non-class or, as we shall show next, class forms, we can 
advance beyond analyzing merely the varying quantities of household labor husbands 
perform. As we shall show, those forms are at least as consequential for households and 
society as is the quantity of husbands’ labor. Second, non-class labor by an appropriator 
of other people’s surplus labor is a possible feature alongside all class structures. For 
example, consider the possible response by a feudal lord in medieval Europe when his 
manor is threatened by some economic, political, or cultural crisis. With appropriate 
fanfare, he may well have pitched in and worked alongside his serfs to, say, rebuild 
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ramparts or gather supplies to withstand siege. His labor in such circumstances need not 
have entailed production of any surplus; it could simply have yielded goods or services 
distributed by him as he and/or the church saw fit. Such a medieval feudal lord’s labor 
was not surplus-producing, whereas his serf’s labor was. The same sort of analysis may 
apply when a modern husband performs labor inside a feudal class-structured household. 
He appropriates his wife’s feudal surplus whether or not he also performs labor as a non-
class adjunct to his wife’s performance of necessary and surplus labor.  
Indeed, we may extend this analysis to other class structures and other social sites. 
For example, consider a productive wage-worker in a capitalist enterprise who sketches, 
during lunch breaks, and then distributes her drawings to fellow workers or keeps them or 
gives them to family and friends. The labor of drawing entails no surplus; it does not 
occur together with a class process. Her sketching labor is rather an adjunct to the 
enterprise’s capitalist class structure. Whether this worker sketches (or not) is separate 
from her position as a surplus producer within the enterprise’s capitalist class structure. 
Likewise when workers and capitalists together clean up a ghetto neighborhood as a 
Sunday charity project, their labor yields goods and services distributed to other 
neighborhood individuals, but no class process occurs together with their labor. 
While household labor by a husband may thus not exhibit any class dimension – it 
generates no surplus itself – its commencement or increase may variously impact the 
household’s feudal class structure as well as class structures outside the household. If and 
when a husband begins or increases household labor without reducing his wage labor 
outside the household – he will have to reduce his R, his non-laboring time. Such a 
reduction in R may, for example, damage the reproduction of the labor power he sells to 
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employers. In an alternative example, the husbands’ household labor can affect the 
household’s feudal class structure. The production and distribution of the husband’s 
output within the household may enable reductions of the feudal wife’s necessary and/or 
surplus labors. She would benefit from such reductions, gaining some R, namely more 
time for rest and other non-labor activities (with all the complex consequences of that on 
the household). However, such reductions presume that some portion of the husband’s 
household labor’s output is distributed either to her for consumption (to offset her 
reduced necessary labor) or to himself for consumption (to offset her reduced surplus 
labor). Of course, such distributions and offsets are possible, not necessary consequences 
of husbands’ household work. With distributions of the husband’s household output for 
alternative purposes, the husband’s household labor might leave the dimensions of the 
household’s feudal class structure largely unchanged. 
 Still other possibilities include a rise in the rate of feudal exploitation of wives 
flowing from their husbands’ undertaking or increasing their own, non-class household 
labor. This might result from the following two-step scenario: first, a husband’s extra 
household work supports his elderly parents newly entered into the household, and 
second, with or without demands from the exhausted husband, his feudal wife delivers 
more surplus to him out of feelings of guilt, admiration, love or combinations thereof 
(without, of course, consciousness of the class dimensions of her activity). The complex 
feelings generated in husbands and wives by the conditions and contradictions of their 
households, marriages, and labor activities yield a range of alternative reactions to any 
changes. We encountered a similarly wide range of possible reactions earlier in 
examining the possible household consequences of a fall in men’s money wages.  
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We turn now to examine how, why, and with what consequences husbands’ 
household labor may occur together with class processes. That is, we consider the 
circumstances under which husbands perform surplus labor inside their households 
(typically in addition to doing so in enterprises outside). Within a feudal household, the 
husband may, for example, produce a surplus working as a serf alongside his wife doing 
likewise. In this case, his work contains a necessary and a surplus labor component – like 
hers – and he is the appropriator of his own as well as her surplus. This is parallel to a 
capitalist spending part of his week working just like and alongside his productive 
employees and then appropriating the surplus value embodied in the commodities they 
and he have together produced. It is also conceivable, although admittedly rare, for the 
husband and wife to divide the different kinds of household labor (e.g. cooking, cleaning, 
etc.) between them such that the wife is serf and the husband lord in some kinds, whereas 
their class positions are reversed in other kinds.  
However, we think it unlikely in the US for husbands to produce feudal surpluses 
for their wives. It is true that women are no longer tied by custom, tradition, and 
economics to work only inside households, increasingly take wage-labor positions 
outside, and enjoy greater personal freedoms and less social inequality vis-à-vis men. 
However, the still dominant cultural norms mark women, and not men, as household 
serfs. Women’s labors inside households remain a basic part of their identities and 
definitions as workers, whereas for men household labor remains incidental and 
tangential to their identities as workers outside households. The latter remain much more 
places where women – whether or not they also hold wage labor positions – rather than 
men perform necessary labor in the sense of reproducing their labor power. In 
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comparison, men mostly buy the means of reproducing their labor power, viewing their 
household labor as secondary, minor, and a gracious gift to wife and family. Likewise, 
the raw statistics of time and energy spent on household tasks reinforces the tangential 
quality of husbands’ household labor; the women continue to do the overwhelming bulk 
of household work.  
It would require drastically different cultural and political conditions than 
currently exist in the US for husbands to perform necessary and surplus labor inside 
households within a feudal class structure, as their wives do. The traditions and rules of 
marriage, like the other norms, customs, and expectations of most contemporary 
societies, still place the primary responsibilities for housework and particularly child care 
on women in the vast majority of households. Women either accept or endure those 
responsibilities, perhaps asking husbands for “some help.” Despite advances over recent 
decades in women’s rights to control their bodies and gain wages comparable to men’s, 
most religious leaders still endorse women’s identification in terms of house and home 
far more than men’s. God is asserted to have bestowed on women, not men, the nurturing 
gene. Husbands and wives still believe in large numbers that their marriage vows and 
their love entail (as well as require) that wives must perform surplus labor inside the 
household’s feudal class structure. Women thus mostly still “choose” to marry, raise 
children, and deliver the fruit of their household surplus labor to their husbands. They 
prepare meals for themselves but also spend the extra labor time preparing meals for their 
husbands; they wash their own and their husbands’ clothing; they make their and their 
husbands’ sides of the bed. What household labor husbands may “generously” undertake 
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is thus very differently understood and differently organized, chiefly we think in the non-
class way discussed above.  
However, there are some exceptions to the dominant patterns of husbands’ doing 
either no household labor or some limited non-class labor within their households. 
Husbands’ household labor could sometimes occur within one of two other household 
class structures. The first of these – and much the more frequently encountered - is 
Marx’s “ancient” class structure; the second kind of household class structure in which 
husbands could work is – in what we, following Marx, have termed - the communist class 
structure. 
Movements such as women’s liberation sometimes and in some places interacted 
with socio-economic shifts to induce women and men to establish marriages and 
households built upon shared commitments to substantial gender equality. In them, wives 
were entitled to earn wages in jobs outside the household. Husbands were obligated to 
share the housework (including child care) on a roughly equal basis with their wives. 
Such equality-focused households displayed an ancient class structure in which husband 
and wife were “ancient partners.”22  Wives in ancient households no longer perform any 
surplus for their husbands (as in feudal households). Instead, both women and men 
become partnered household workers performing tasks according to an implicit or 
explicit division of household labor between them. Each partner performs a roughly equal 
share of the necessary labor of preparing meals, cleaning, washing clothes, and so forth to 
reproduce their individual (ancient) household labor power. Each then also performs a 
surplus above and beyond that necessary labor and each alone appropriates his/her own 
surplus labor’s product. They work out some method of distributing their respective 
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surpluses to secure the conditions of existence of their household’s ancient class 
structure.23 
A specific social context is needed to enable this kind of self-appropriating class 
structure to exist in households. Men and women must somehow have come to feel 
strongly that no marriage rule or custom is acceptable that obligates either of them to 
perform any (surplus) labor for the other’s benefit. Given the prevalence of social 
conditions and norms entwining women in feudal household arrangements, some social 
space of dissent from and resistance to those norms would have had to exist. Women and 
men would have required such a space to conceive of households as partnerships of equal 
individual laborers (performing physical and emotional tasks) where neither “bosses” the 
other. Were class consciousness part of such husbands’ and wives’ self awareness, they 
might describe their households as sites where two self-appropriators of their own 
surpluses chose to cohabit and build a family around that particular class structure.   
Husbands’ household labors may take a class form other than the above described 
ancient partnership. This occurs if husband and wife undertake household labor together 
as a fully shared activity, collectively producing, appropriating, and distributing the 
surpluses produced inside their households. They may do this as a couple or possibly 
integrate others (relatives, friends, and housemates) into such a communist household. 
What distinguishes its class structure from the ancient is its collectivity. In an ancient 
household class structure, two individual producers who individually appropriate their 
individual surpluses work out a partnership household. In a communist household class 
structure, the collective of laboring household members (two or more) produce, 
appropriate and distribute their surpluses collectively.  
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For the communist class structure to exist within households, its conditions of 
existence must be in place within the larger social context. That is, the politics, culture 
and economics of some portion of the society would have to determine in women and 
men the desire and the demand for equality and community inside households (rather 
than feudal subordination or ancient individuality). Such wives and husbands would 
reject those aspects of the larger society that pressed women to serve men unilaterally in 
marriage and home. Similarly, such men and women would find households organized 
around the ancient class structure producer unattractive and unacceptable because they 
would associate it with lonely self-interest and self-absorbing behavior.  
Women and men forming communist class structured households would reflect as 
well as advance ways of thinking that celebrate collectivity at home and perhaps even in 
society more generally. To sustain collective production, appropriation, and distribution 
of household surpluses, husbands and wives would likely establish as well collective 
means of wielding power inside the communist class structured household. That is, the 
distribution of authority between and among adults and children there would take on 
collective and egalitarian dimensions unlike the lordly authority typically arrogated to 
feudal husbands or the individually separated powers of the ancient household. Similarly 
collective and egalitarian processes of producing and disseminating meanings (i.e., 
cultural processes) inside the household (religious, educational, artistic, and so on) would 
likewise reflect and reinforce a communist class structure there. Indeed, the social space 
for and existence of such political and cultural processes would be prerequisites for the 
existence of communist class structures inside households. Wives and husbands could 
and would collectively produce, appropriate and distribute household surpluses only if 
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the larger society made such behavior conceivable, desirable, and operational in some 
form and also preferable to alternative household class structures for some members of 
that society.24 Finally, the communist class structured household may include household 
laborers who also engaged in earning money incomes outside the household. If so – and 
quite like the parallel situation in feudal and ancient class structured households – the 
communist class structured household would exhibit a budget that combines monetized 
and non-monetized revenues and expenditures to reproduce the multiple, various class 
structures its adults engage.  
 
When children become household serfs   
Having assumed to this point that children are not able or not required to perform 
significant household labor, we may now relax that assumption. In this way we may 
extend some initial explorations by others likewise interested in the consequences of 
children’s labor for households and their class structures (Fraad 2000, 74-76; Safri 2005, 
chap. 2). In households containing feudal class structures, children are typically 
integrated, once they begin to perform labor, as additional household serfs. They thus 
come to resemble, rather closely, the organization often found in medieval European 
feudalism. Such children are tied by familial and legal arrangements to an exploiting 
father – head of the feudal household - who appropriates the surplus produced by the 
household’s children. Culture, law, religion, and so on intervene to bestow on the fathers 
the considerable power (which he may delegate) to order children’s behavior including 
their household surplus labor. Also parallel to European feudalism, the fathers and 
mothers of such children are morally and legally obliged to care for and protect them. 
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Finally, these social forces also influence children to accept and obey the orders, 
decisions, and wishes of “the father” (or any others to whom the father may delegate such 
authority). The children will often find it “normal and natural” that a certain age brings an 
obligation for them to “share” the housework (likely with no more consciousness of its 
class – surplus – aspects than their parents possess). That most children eventually chafe 
and often rebel against their feudal households reflects in part the constraints of early 
childhood, the difficult transition to feudal serfdom as they grow older, and the mix of 
resentment and guilt in their reactions.  
Children’s household serfdom displays three major variant forms. In one, the 
father continues to receive the wife’s surplus while adding the appropriation of surpluses 
produced by the children. In a second arrangement, while the wife continues to perform 
surplus for her husband, she assumes a surplus appropriating role in relation to working 
children. As in medieval Europe, serfs can also have serfs. In a third possible form of 
children’s household feudal class position, both parents share the surplus-appropriating 
position, a kind of collective appropriation of their children’s surplus. In all three of these 
forms, children do variable kinds and quantities of necessary and surplus labor: cleaning 
their rooms and clothes, preparing their meals, shopping, household repairs, and the like. 
Such children thus shift from being the objects of (mostly women’s) surplus labor in the 
form of child care and become subjects performing surplus labor: a specifically class 
dimension of children’s “growing up.” 
 
Children’s feudal exploitation inside households exercises varying impacts. It 
may simply be additive to the wife’s and so yield a rising mass of in-kind surplus for the 
 51
father. Had he been doing some household labor, the opportunity to appropriate his 
children’s surplus might allow him to reduce or eliminate his own household labor and 
thereby realized an expanded free time (R). Alternatively, such a father might utilize his 
children’s surplus to reproduce the labor power he sells to an employer outside the 
household. In this way, children’s serfdom adds still another layer of complexity to 
struggles over the household budget. As we have already shown, the household budget 
can often entail diversions of the husband’s wage income from purchasing commodities 
to reproduce his own labor power to, for example, expenditures to care for young 
children. This can threaten that wage income. Yet that same child care can eventuate in 
children’s surplus labor later that the father can consume to reproduce or enhance the 
labor power he sells outside the household. In short, here is yet another way that children 
interact with their feudal households in contradictory ways, variously undermining yet 
also strengthening them.  
Children’s surplus labor could impact feudal households differently were the wife 
to appropriate that surplus. Suppose the older children’s surplus labor yields roughly the 
same bundle of goods and services as the wife’s necessary and surplus labor. The father 
could then continue to receive an undiminished quantity of surplus, if the wife transferred 
to him the children’s household surplus. The wife might then herself consume her own 
household surplus, thereby freeing herself from household feudalism. In this stark 
example, she substitutes the feudal exploitation of her children for her own. That 
substitution might be difficult to rationalize or legitimate if conceptualized in terms of the 
burden of labor, let alone in terms of class. Children’s work and exploitation might then 
seem a heavy price to pay for a wife’s liberation from those burdens. A much more 
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appealing (to parents) conceptualization would construe all this quite differently, as a 
matter of helping children to mature into responsible adults by undertaking instructive 
and constructive household chores. Wives especially might thus insist on children’s 
attendance at churches where authoritative clergy can reiterate such an appealing 
conceptualization as perhaps biblical in origin and power.  
Another possible impact of children producing household surpluses for the wife 
rather than the husband might involve the wife continuing to produce surplus for the 
husband. Not only would the serf wife than have serfs of her own, but the two layers of 
serfdom would differ in their household power positions but not in their household class 
positions. Children and their mothers would then both be feudal serfs, but their mothers 
would have much the greater power and status within the household. Arresting parallels 
with medieval Europe suggest themselves. Feudal manors often displayed layers of more 
and less powerful serfs and serfs of serfs.  Additionally, a lord might place a trusted serf 
in a managerial position over less trusted serfs only to find the trusted serf slowly 
transforming such management into the very different position of him appropriating the 
surplus of those he manages. Likewise, the feudal husband may trust his wife to manage 
the children’s household labors only to discover that she may have altered the situation to 
become herself the direct appropriator of the children’s household surplus. Both feudal 
household wife and medieval serf could continue to produce surpluses for their husband 
and their manorial lord, even as they appropriated the surpluses of the children and lesser 
serfs below them in their respective feudal hierarchies. 
When children perform household surplus that is appropriated by both parents 
conjointly, the impact of the children’s labor may well be different. For example, this 
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arrangement may emerge as a kind of compensation for a feudal wife: while she is serf to 
her husband they are equal appropriators of their children’s surplus. Conjoint parental 
appropriation of children’s surplus labor may also reflect the difficulty of either parent 
accomplishing such appropriation alone. Then children’s household exploitation can 
function as a kind of cement for the parents’ relationship. In households with non-feudal 
class structures, such conjoint appropriation of their children’s surplus could have yet 
other impacts. For example, in ancient or communist class structured households, the 
transition of young children into children doing household work need not necessarily be 
accompanied by the integration of those children into the parent’s household class 
structure.25 Parents might then occupy one class position in relation to their children and 
a different class position in relation to one another: within households where the adults 
function within ancient or communist class structures, they might organize the children 
that reach a working age into a feudal class structure as their serfs. The parents might 
then conjointly appropriate their children’s surpluses, even as their class connection to 
one another is either ancient or communist. Just as parents differentiate their 
interpersonal connection from their relationship to their children – in, say, their financial 
or sexual or power dimensions – so too can they structure the class relation of husband to 
wife very differently from that of children to parents. Of course, given the likely absence 
of class consciousness in the parents, they are unlikely to be conscious of a different class 
relation to their children. Instead, they may justify their children’s feudal serfdom as 
required by their age, immaturity, lack of experience, education, hormones, lack of good 
judgment, and so forth. 
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We have hardly exhausted the complexity of class relationships among children 
and parents or the range of their possible impacts. We have not, for example, devoted 
attention to such possibilities as children exploiting their parents or one another.26 Nor 
have we examined the subsumed class positions inside households: the positions of 
people who neither produce nor appropriate surpluses but rather provide the conditions of 
existence for the production and appropriation of the surplus. What we have elsewhere 
elaborated about subsumed classes in relation to capitalist enterprises can be readily 
extended to the class analysis of households (Resnick and Wolff 1987, Chapters 3 and 4). 
Thus, for example, a manager in a capitalist manufacturing enterprise is neither a surplus 
producer nor an appropriator; he/she rather provides the supervision of personnel or the 
purchasing of inputs or the sales of outputs that are all conditions required for surplus to 
be produced within the enterprise. Because such managers are paid via distributions to 
them of portions of the surplus appropriated by the enterprise’s board of directors, they 
occupy capitalist subsumed class positions. By direct analogy, management of children’s 
household labor may be a condition for surplus to be produced by them. Perhaps the wife 
will need to manage and so receive a portion of the household surplus for doing so. In 
other words, a complete class analysis of households, as of any other social site where 
class processes may occur, would need to include the subsumed classes. The latter 
comprise the “enablers” of surplus production – rather than being either producers or 
appropriators of household surpluses themselves - who get distributed shares of the 
surplus. Households, like enterprises, display class structures that include both the 
fundamental class processes (that define the performers and appropriators of the surplus) 
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and the subsumed class processes (that define how the appropriators distribute the surplus 
to those others whose activities “enable” the fundamental class process to continue).  
 
Addendum: Households without class structures 
 
Even our introductory analysis of the rich diversity of class structures that 
households may contain must include at least a brief mention of households without any 
class processes. We believe they are becoming more common in advanced capitalist 
countries today, especially where women have moved quickly into full time paid 
employment. Such households no longer display class processes because they are no 
longer social sites where production occurs (or they are, at least, approaching such 
conditions). Instead, such households have become sites almost exclusively of 
consumption and not of labor.  
Some historical examples of this phenomenon can help to clarify its theoretical 
dimensions and implications. After 1917, the Bolsheviks debated the possibilities of a 
vast social transformation that would eradicate the exploitative production arrangements 
inside households and so liberate Soviet women (to join their husbands in wage labor and 
also to free them for full social participation). In the course of the Soviet debates, the 
focus was less on changing the class structures of households (say from feudal to 
communist) and more on changing households from sites of production and consumption 
to sites of only consumption. Some concrete steps were taken in the 1920s to realize such 
changes (Resnick and Wolff 2002, chapter 7). 
When little or no production occurs there, households likewise stop being sites of 
surplus production, appropriation, and distribution. In short, as households lose their class 
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structures, so wives and husbands no longer need to work or strive (consciously or 
unconsciously) to reproduce those class structures. Their household budgets may become 
simplified in so far as they lose their non-monetary components. Money incomes from 
household members’ jobs outside the household (and perhaps also borrowings) become 
the only revenue, and cash outlays (to buy commodities and perhaps service their debts) 
become the only expenditures. Eliminating households as places of production (and 
hence of class structures, tensions, and struggles) requires as well as furthers basic 
changes in how men and women identify themselves and conceive of their relationships 
to one another, to children, and to the larger economy and society. 
In modern societies where capitalist class structures prevail in enterprises, 
households may cease production to become places to which husbands and wives retreat 
from the market and from their job. They retreat in order to consume there the 
commodities they purchased to reproduce the labor power they sell to their employers. 
For examples, instead of home-produced meals, they spend their wages to purchase store-
prepared meals; instead of cleaning their homes and their clothes at home, they buy 
house-cleaning, laundering, and dry-cleaning as service commodities; and instead of 
caring for their children, they hire commercial childcare providers. Other comparable 
examples include proliferating commercial personal shopper services, healthcare 
providers, landscapers, repairers, security guards, and so on. Of course, affluence will 
also play some role in determining how far each household can go in reducing household 
production to consumption. However, at least inside the United States, abundant evidence 
already shows that many households at all income levels have reduced production; their 
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differing affluence affects rather the quality and costs of the commodities they all 
purchase increasingly to replace household production. Among  
Of course, in relatively few households, even in the United States, has production 
been totally eliminated. Some work usually has still to be done inside the household even 
when its members consume goods and services almost exclusively purchased from 
producers outside the household. In many societies, much household production remains 
the norm. Moreover, economic, political, and cultural shifts may well reverse the process 
of substituting commodity consumption for household production where it has occurred. 
Hence, despite the forces at work constricting household production, it remains a major 
social site of production and of class around the world. It seems to us long overdue for 
the sort of class analysis commenced here. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 As far as we know, one of the first attempts to theorize children in class as surplus terms was set forth by 
Gibson-Graham (1996, 214).  
2 When the property is used by productive capitalists – those in whose industrial enterprises productive 
laborers generate surplus value – then the property-owning children’s incomes constitute subsumed class 
revenues. Those revenues secure the provision of the children’s productive property to the industrial 
capitalist for the latter’s use in appropriating surplus from productive laborers hired by that capitalist. The 
children receive distributed portions of that surplus from the capitalist. If and when the children’s property 
is used instead by unproductive capitalists such as merchants and bankers, then the children’s income is not 
a surplus distributed by an appropriating capitalist, but is rather non-class revenue. The subsumed class vs. 
non-class revenue sources for children underscores the different possible relationships between property-
owning children and class structures that include both productive and unproductive capitalist enterprises: 
see Resnick and Wolff (1987) and Wolff and Resnick (1987) for discussions of productive vs. unproductive 
capitalists. 
3 In Marxian terms, the goods and services (use-values) received and consumed by the child can be 
understood to also possess a “value” (without adjective) measurable by the socially necessary abstract labor 
hours materialized in such use values. 
4 The following illustrates what we mean by the two processes of labor and class operating within the 
feudal household. The wife engages in a household labor process:  L(F) x a = UVH where L(F) stands for 
her total feudal labor performed, say, over a day, a for her labor productivity, and UVH the quantity of use 
values – household wealth – produced per day, a product of her labor times its productivity. The Marxian 
tradition often refers to or locates this labor process within the “forces of production.” The class process 
refers to something very different. Over the same day, the wife also engages in a feudal class process:  
LNL (F) x a =  UVNL  where her feudal necessary labor LNL (F) times its productivity, a, yields household 
consumption to sustain her, UVNL. However, over that day she also labors above and beyond that necessary 
labor performing  surplus labor, LSL (F), yielding wealth, UVSL, for her husband: LSL (F) x a =  UVSL. Her 
class exploitation is measured either in surplus labor time, LSL (F), or its yield, UVSL. The same Marxian 
tradition typically refers to this class process as the “relations of production.”         
5 The assumption typically made in discussions of class exploitation is that necessary and surplus labor 
takes the same concrete forms: for example, the wife produces, say, prepared meals and repaired clothes to 
sustain her and additional quantities of the same items delivered to her husband. However, that assumption 
is not necessary. A new mother within a feudal household may continue to perform necessary and surplus 
labor in the concrete forms of meals (and washed clothes, cleaned space, etc.), while adding or substituting 
a new concrete form of her surplus labor, namely child care. This situation parallels the typical 
circumstance in the European medieval manorial economy when serfs performed necessary labor 
producing one kind of crop on the land they had use of and surplus labor yielding a completely different 
crop when working on the lord’s land. They sometimes produced no crop at all for the lord but rather 
performed their surplus labor for him in the concrete forms of making or repairing his furniture or 
providing childcare to his children. Class exploitation takes place in these examples – e.g., the performance 
of a surplus labor over and beyond necessary – even though different concrete forms of wealth flow from 
the performance of, respectively, necessary and surplus labor.     
6 Partly because sexual services, like child care, are rarely analyzed within a class theoretic framework, and 
partly because of certain parallels in wives’ resistance to increased exploitation within households’ feudal 
class structures, we offer this brief class analysis. As with any other labor process – the use of brains and 
muscles to produce a good or a service - sexual labor can be conceptualized as yielding a specific service, 
namely sexual pleasure. Sexual labor need not, but it may occur together with a class process, i.e. 
intertwined with the production and appropriation of surplus labor. Thus, for example, a wife in a feudal 
class-structured household may have a sexual relationship with her husband such that she engages in sexual 
labor not to provide sexual pleasure only to her but rather to provide sexual pleasure also to her husband, 
while his sexual labor is not similarly focused in delivering a comparable surplus to her. That is, the quality 
of the sexual relationship between wife and husband may entail exploitation. Then, such a wife might well 
produce necessary household labor yielding prepared meals, cleaned rooms, etc. plus surplus labor yielding 
those items and also sexual pleasure for her husband and also child care for resulting children. Indeed, from 
this class perspective, the general question arises: how may feudal class processes (of producing, 
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appropriating, and distributing surpluses), when they characterize household production, influence other 
processes – cultural, sexual, emotional, etc. - inside those households?             
7 Given the labor intensity of child care, we surmise that most wives will likely resist continuing to perform 
other household labors – or at least try to perform them less intensively. Consciously or otherwise, they will 
at least want – if not easily be able – to offer fewer meals, do less washing and cleaning, and provide fewer 
sexual services, notwithstanding considerable guilt about such desires.  
8 We will not here inquire into the problem of the initial money needed to establish feudal households. That 
analysis is largely derivative of our text’s discussion of the monetary payments needed for an existing 
feudal household to be reproduced. 
9 Strictly speaking and for completeness we should include here monetary outlays to provide the tools, 
equipment and raw materials to begin any new labor process assigned to the wife within a feudal class 
structure inside the household. For example, when children arrive and the wife must add additional surplus 
labor, money outlays will be needed to provide her with the requisite tools, equipment, and raw materials to 
commence that surplus labor. These money outlays are different from those discussed in the text, namely 
on-going outlays to replenish used up tools, equipment and raw materials. As noted earlier in the text, for 
simplicity we will generally ignore outlays to begin or establish new household feudal labor; our focus will 
be on the on-going replenishment outlays.  
10 Other key demands that add their contribution to the right hand side of the equation and enhance the 
inequality sign would be various kinds of taxes paid to the state, union dues, and workers’ savings. Along 
with the household budget, they too contribute to the crisis experienced by the wage worker.  
11  On this point, Marx in Capital vol. 1 offers two different formulations of what are included in the “sum 
of means of subsistence” to reproduce workers’ labor power. In one, he theorizes the value of labor power 
as equal to the “value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner” (Marx, 274). 
Marx explains that those means of subsistence are required or necessary to enable the worker and the 
worker alone in laboring to replace expended human muscle and brain. He goes on to explain how  
society’s “historical and moral element” helps to shape the actual quantitative amount and qualitative 
nature of those means of subsistence necessary to reproduce just the owner’s labor power (Marx, 275).  
However, when Marx, on the same page, comes to discuss the mortality of the owner of labor power, he 
offers a second and different theorization of the value of labor power. He does this by newly including in 
those means of subsistence those necessary to support the worker’s children so that “this race of peculiar 
commodity-owners may perpetuate its presence on the market” (Marx, 275). As far as we can determine, it 
is one thing to specify a bundle of means of subsistence to reproduce only the owner’s sold labor power at a 
point in and over time; it is quite another to add to that bundle an amount aimed at reproducing the same 
owner’s children as potential suppliers of labor power. That owners of labor power have children, typically 
within a family relationship, is, of course, relevant and requires further analysis. That the reproduction of 
capitalism requires a continued source of sellers of labor power as one of its conditions of existence also is 
relevant and needs analysis. Nonetheless, their pertinence and analytical attention do not warrant 
introducing an inconsistency into the logic of the value analysis, whether by Marx or anyone else. The 
inconsistency results from conflating the conditions required to reproduce no more than the workers’ sold 
labor power as a commodity with the different conditions required to sustain a ready supply of future 
workers. Instead, we suggest that the introduction of children (and family) be handled similarly to Marx’s 
introduction of still other analytical categories of price of production, unproductive labor, and so forth. 
Each new specification requires an extension and elaboration of the value analysis to include its presence 
and consequences. That is what we intend here for the categories of children and family and that is what 
inequality 2 portrays. 
12 A parallel result holds for all other kinds of “leakages” from income received such as taxes to the state, 
charitable donations, and savings. Similar to the impact of the household budget, each of these threatens the 
reproduction of labor power by reducing the worker’s purchase of wage commodities. Each of these also 
serves in its unique way to help strengthen the reproduction of labor power. Our focus here is only on the 
contradictory nature of the household budget, but the analysis could be extended to show the conflicts 
presented by other kinds of leakages as well.   
13 While we wish here to stress how household feudalism can undermine enterprise capitalism, we do not 
deny that household feudalism also supports capitalist class structures in enterprises. For example, caring 
for children in feudal households may provide future suppliers of enhanced quantities and qualities of labor 
power to capitalism. Budgets to support household feudalism also help to secure capitalism by expanding 
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markets for its produced commodities. In any case – and this is the focus of our text – such diversions of 
fathers’ wages have an immediate undercutting effect on the reproduction of their labor power and hence 
on their roles in capitalist class structures. This immediate effect is what provokes the reaction of a 
reorganization of household feudalism to compensate for and thereby offset the threatened reproduction of 
the father’s labor power. 
14 While the emergence of this world-view helped result in a stronger feudal household including better 
protected and cared for children, we fully understand that these same households and children often face a 
precarious existence. The numbers are well known: after only a few years of marriage some 50% of 
marriages end in divorce or separation; too many children too often suffer physical and emotional abuse 
within the home. Exploitation and class contradictions of the sort we elaborate here contribute to these sad 
numbers.    
15 Note also that the NCRM  term in Equation 3 is equal to the YHB term in Equation 1. As noted in the text 
earlier, the transfer entails the passage of a portion of the husband’s wages from his position in a capitalist 
class structure (the enterprise) to his position as an appropriator of the wife’s feudal surplus (the 
household); it is a value transfer between the two different class positions the husband occupies. 
16 As suggested earlier, for simplicity of exposition we will here ignore the outlays for tools, equipment, 
and raw materials used up in household production to concentrate on feudal subsumed class outlays. No 
logical or theoretical problem arises if such replenishment outlays were to be added to the discussion in the 
text. 
17  Referring again to Marx’s “historical and moral element” entering into the determination of workers’ 
“necessary requirements,” that is, their real wage (Marx, 275),  we think such a changed “element” 
affecting  workers’ real wages arose in the US after the 1970s and soon became hegemonic. Contributing to 
this change was a theorization, formulated by neoclassical economists partly in opposition to the 
dominance of Keynesian theorizations and policies and supported by the media, business, and the Reagan 
political revolution, in which workers’ unions and union-won wages were responsible for much of the 
internationally competitive difficulties faced by capitalist business at that time. In this world-view, 
workers’ unions were portrayed as a “special interest group” that inflicted relatively high wages, archaic 
work rules, and constrained productivity that together worked against America’s economic growth 
including growing jobs for workers.  That view combined with eroded union power (initiated in 1981 with 
the Reagan offense against striking air controllers) and with dramatic changes in the labor market (a 
relatively constrained expansion of demand because of a rising organic composition of capital, even as 
labor supply rose dramatically because of a combination of rising legal but above all illegal immigration, 
women entering the labor force, and restriction on the state as the employer of last instance) produced a 
social environment in which workers’ lowered real wage became rational and unavoidable even to workers 
themselves. Persuaded that their claimed high unit labor costs were the essential cause of business’ inability 
to compete successfully with more efficient Japanese and German enterprises, workers, fearful of losing 
their jobs, acquiesced and came to accept lower real wages as a long run solution. 
 
18 While an important contributing cause, men’s depressed wages were hardly the only reason for women 
entering the labor force. The culture in the land had changed to a view in which women were to balance the 
competing demands of career and family rather than – what it was for so long – managing only a home for 
their husbands and children. Whereas married women’s mass participation in the labor force was once 
considered unusual, save for death of their husband or war, now the norm became participation in the work 
force when married and even when children arrived. Further, a long and relatively successful struggle for 
women’s rights not only gave women power to make decisions over their bodies including the right to 
place it in the workplace, but also helped to give rise to a more inviting, less discriminating, and, in 
penalizing sexual harassment, a safer workplace for them. Laws thus changed making it that much easier to 
leave the household, compete with men for work and promotion, and narrow the gap between what they 
and men earned for comparable work.            
19 The impact on women’s R may vary directly with their position outside households. For example, 
women who occupy subsumed class managerial positions in capitalist enterprises often are required to 
work longer hours than do women who occupy positions as productive laborers there. Hence the resulting 
stress on their households from their pinched R can be more severe, even though compared to women who 
occupy positions of productive laborers they are not exploited and receive higher incomes.       
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20 Of course, many of these young women are also wives inside households that share many of the class and 
non-class contradictions depicted in the preceding text. See the dissertation by Safri (2005) for an analysis 
of immigrant households. 
21 Many labor activities in all societies occur without the accompaniment of any class process (i.e. without 
the production of any surplus). For example, an individual walking through a forest collecting pieces of 
wood, carving them into birds, and distributing them to children is certainly engaged in labor (using brains 
and muscles to transform objects found in nature into consumable products). However, no surplus is 
produced or distributed; the labor process occurs but not together with any class process. Other examples 
include many other kinds of artistic productions, the preparation of an occasional sandwich for oneself, 
family or friends; helping a neighbor clean a garage; reading a story to help children fall asleep, and so on. 
Of course, every one of these examples could, in other social circumstances, occur with a class process; 
that is they could occur such that a surplus is produced, appropriated, and distributed in some way. Our 
point here is only to register – and explore the significant implications of – the two possibilities: that a 
particular labor process may or may note occur together with a class process.  
22 As far as we know, the term “ancient partnership” was first coined and applied analytically by Satya 
Gabriel (1990); we gratefully acknowledge our debt to him for this very useful concept. Child care and 
children and much else too would be affected by the existence of or a change from a feudal to an ancient 
class structure. For example, no longer would women be associated with and responsible for much if not all 
of childcare obligations as occurs in the traditional feudal home.     
23 Such an ancient class-structured household will also develop a household budget that parallels the budget 
analyzed above in the case of the feudal household. Thus, the ancient partnership household’s budget will 
have revenues that combine the monetized income from husband’s and/or wife’s wage work outside the 
household with the in-kind products of their household labors. That budget’s expenditures will likewise 
combine monetized and non-monetized outlays including those aimed to secure both the external wage 
income (likely from occupying one or another capitalist class position) of husband and/or wife and their 
“partnered” ancient class positions within the household.  
24 Because we think the typical household is still organized in the traditional, feudal way, save for at least 
some men there offering their labor but without participating in any class process, we think combinations of 
class structures existing in the same household while feasible also to be rare. For example, we think it 
unlikely that a traditional feudal home in which women perform surplus for men will co-exist with an 
ancient in which men perform surplus only for themselves or with a communist in which they also 
appropriate surplus collectively. 
25 In fact, a similar situation likely existed in some Native American tribes. Where their class structures 
were communist (Amariglio 1984, ch. 3), they sometimes integrated captured “outsiders” as slaves (i.e. in a 
slave class relation) rather than as sharing the same communist class relationship as themselves. 
26 There are problems with both possibilities. To theorize children as surplus receivers requires specifying 
those social processes that could place them in a position to receive a surplus produced by others. Before 
children reach a minimum age, it is difficult to see how they might distribute a surplus they appropriate to 
secure such social processes (and it is difficult to see how those social processes might be secured without 
surplus distributions). Similarly, if surplus-appropriating children needed to make monetized payments 
outside the household, where could they secure the cash without money incomes of their own? To argue 
that conditions of existence for children appropriating household surpluses might all be internal and thus 
non-monetized might be possible, but such an argument stretches credulity. 
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